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ABSTRACT 
 
Family law in Australia and Fiji provides that marriages can be void 
on various grounds, including duress and fraud. Despite some differences, 
United Kingdom (UK) law says marriages can be void or voidable on 
similar grounds. Courts in each jurisdiction have granted annulment in 
cases of forced marriage where duress “threatens life and limb”. Courts 
now say lesser force or threats, including pressure to comply with 
religious or traditional duty, can nullify marriage. Yet courts continue to 
require high level force such as passport confiscation, physical abuse, 
threats of eviction from the family home, and economic harm. This, as 
with allegations of fraud which receive short shrift, results from returning 
to common law authorities decided before migration resulted in 
significant demographic changes, particularly regarding culture and 
religion. UK authority draws a distinction between “forced” and 
“arranged” marriages, saying nullity is granted rightly in cases of the 
former, yet because “culture” “sanctifies” the latter, refusing nullity is 
right. Yet is this distinction valid? Should such marriages be recognised 
by Australian, Fijian and UK courts as contracted with full and free 
consent of the parties? An exploration of contemporary cases against the 
common law background to fraud and duress as nullity grounds indicates 
that allowing culture to be the measure denies women’s (and sometimes 
men’s) entitlement to contract marriage with full and free consent 
according to international human rights law. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In April 2013, Pakistan’s Sindh Province passed the Child Marriage 
Restraint Act criminalising marriages of girls under 18 years of age.1 
Earlier, in March 2011, the German Bundestag approved a law imposing 
∗ The Hon Dr Jocelynne A Scutt, Barrister and Human Rights Lawyer, Visiting 
Professor and Senior Fellow, the University of Buckingham. 
1 See further below. 
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five years imprisonment upon any person convicted of forcing another 
into marriage.2 Germany, along with Austria, the Netherlands and 
prospectively Belgium, also imposed a minimum age for marriage visas. 
So did the UK. Later (in 2014) forcing someone into marriage in England 
and Wales or forcing a British national into marriage outside the UK 
became unlawful, carrying a seven-year maximum penalty.3 However, the 
UK visa requirement came under challenge. In October 2011, the 
Supreme Court in R (on the application of Quila and another) 
(FC)(Respondents) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
(Appellant)4 struck down paragraph 277 of the Immigration Rules banning 
entry for settlement of foreign spouses or civil partners unless both were 
21 years or above.  
 
ENGLAND & WALES CASES 
 
These criminal and civil law measures were intended to combat forced 
marriage. Generally, the problem is understood as having become acute in 
Western countries with increased migration from countries where culture, 
religion and tradition are perceived to play a major role in selection of 
marriage partners for reasons other than “love match” or “acceptable” 
arrangement.5 With forced marriage, choice is not open to the parties. In 
Quila6 the Secretary of State advanced the sole purpose of the Rule as 
being to deter or prevent forced marriage. The Rule provided that no 
partner or prospective partner under 21 years of age would be issued with 
a marriage visa, namely entry clearance, leave to enter, leave to remain or 
variation of leave on marriage grounds. The Supreme Court considered a 
2 ‘Penalties for Forced Marriages: Berlin Passes New Integration Measure’, 
SpiegelOnline (18 March 2011), 
 <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/penalties-for-forced-marriage-
berlin-passes-new-integration-measures-a-7517409.html> accessed 21 March 
2011. 
3 Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (UK), ss 121 and 122.  
4 [2011] UKSC 45. 
5 Quila (ibid (n 4)) [9] (Lord Wilson) puts the ‘prevalence of forced marriage 
within sections of’ the UK community as coming ‘increasingly to the attention of 
a shocked public’ over the preceding 12 years ‘as victims of it, or witnesses to it, 
have at least and less infrequently summoned the courage to report it’. The 1999 
date is referable to the Home Office having established in that year a Forced 
Marriage Working Group. “Arranged” marriages are seen as acceptable, a 
distinction being drawn between the latter and forced marriages. See further this 
article. 
6 [2011] UKSC 45. 
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legitimate aim under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) “for the rights and freedoms of others” to be “preventing, 
deterring or delaying” forced marriages. Yet was the Rule necessary in a 
democratic society as a proportionate response to a pressing social need?7 
Wilson LJ adopted Bingham LJ’s Huang v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department8 formula: 
 
a) is the legislative objective sufficiently important to justify limiting 
a fundamental right? 
b) are the measures designed to meet it rationally connected to it? 
c) are they no more than necessary to accomplish it? 
d) do they strike a fair balance between the rights of the individual 
and the interests of the community?9 
 
The majority (Brown LJ dissenting)10 determined the Rule as 
incompatible with Article 8. Hale LJ identified three bases for offending 
against proportionality: 
 
• interfering with “many more entirely voluntary marriages” than 
preventing, deterring or delaying forced marriages, the Secretary 
of State “scarcely [having] considered … the scale and severity of 
the impact upon these unforced marriages”;11 
• an “entire lack of clarity” whether the rule had the “desired effect 
upon the marriages it [was] designed to prevent or deter”;12 and 
• the Rule “may do a great deal more harm than good” for “A 
young woman may be sent abroad and forced to marry against her 
will and kept there until she can sponsor her husband to [the 
United Kingdom]. During this time she may be raped many times, 
bear children she does not want to have and be deprived of the 
education and life she would otherwise have had [in the UK] …”13 
 
Albeit addressing immigration law, R (Quila and another) v Secretary 
of State is instructive when it comes to nullity of forced marriages.  
 
7 Quila (ibid (n 4)) [45] (Lord Wilson), [73] (Lady Hale). 
8 [2007] 2 AC 167. 
9 Quila (ibid (n 4)) [49] (Lord Wilson). 
10 Ibid [81]-[97]. 
11 Ibid [74]. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid [75]. 
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FORCED AND ARRANGED MARRIAGES 
 
The Family Law Act 1996 (EW) addresses this at point of marriage: s 
63Q  
Shortly after issuing Rule 8, the Secretary of State published a guide 
to forced marriage, identifying “some of the key motives”, said to include: 
 
• Controlling unwanted sexuality (including perceive promiscuity, 
or being lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender) – particular the 
behaviour and sexuality of women. 
• Controlling unwanted behaviour, for example, alcohol and drug 
use, wearing make-up or behaving in a “westernised manner”. 
• Preventing “unsuitable” relationships, for example, outside the 
ethnic, cultural, religious or caste group. 
• Protecting “family honour” or “izzat”. 
• Responding to peer group or family pressure. 
• Attempting to strengthen family links. 
• Achieving financial gain. 
• Ensuring land, property and wealth remain within the family. 
• Protecting perceived cultural ideals. 
• Protecting perceived religious ideals which are misguided. 
• Ensuring care for a child or vulnerable adult with special needs 
when parents or existing carers are unable to fulfil that role. 
• Assisting claims for UK residence and citizenship. 
• Long-standing family commitments.14  
 
In England and Wales, a distinction is drawn between forced and 
arranged marriages, the latter being acceptable, the former not.15 
Acceptability is spelled out by Wilson LJ in Quila as where one party 
14 Ibid [76]. 
15 See Forced Marriage Unit (FMU), Forced Marriage: A Wrong Not a Right – 
Summary of Responses to the Consultation on the Criminalisation of Forced 
Marriage (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, UK); Home Office, A 
Choice By Right – The Report of the Working Group on Forced Marriage 
(London, 2000); Centre LGS, Response to the Home Office Consultation 
Document – ‘Forced Marriage: A Wrong Not A Right’, ANRC Research Centre 
for Law, Gender and Sexuality, London, UK, November 2005; UK Parliament, 
‘Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Bill [HL]’, Hansard – House of Lords, 26 
January 2007, pp 1-5,  
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/pabills/200607/forced_marriage_civil
_protection.htm> accessed 14 April 2014. 
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enters “not only without her or his free and full consent but also as a result 
of force including coercion by threats or by other psychological means”, 
citing ss 63A (4) and (6) Family Law Act 1996, inserted by s 1 of the 
Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007.16 Further, a forced marriage 
is “entirely different” from an arranged marriage where “in conformity 
with their cultural expectations, two persons consent to marry pursuant to 
an arrangement negotiated between their respective families”.17 Next, 
referring to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948: 
Article 16(2), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) 1966, Article 23(3) and ECHR, Article 12, Wilson LJ said 
forced marriage is a “gross and abhorrent violation” of rights. 18  
Apart from the ECHR, these, along with other international 
instruments, refer to free consent to marry. The UDHR affirms “free and 
full consent of the intending spouses”,19 which the ICCPR reiterates 
(Article 23), adding the “right of men and women of marriageable age to 
marry”.20 Albeit not referred to, Article 16(1)(b) of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
insists on a “basis of equality of men and women”, with free choice of 
spouse and “full and free consent”.21 The CEDAW Committee’s General 
Recommendation 21 specifically affirms women’s rights of spousal 
choice and entering marriage freely as “central to her life and her dignity 
and equality as a human being”. 22 Meanwhile, the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Article 10 says 
marriage “must be entered into with the free consent of the intending 
spouses …”23 Curiously, the ECHR refers (Article 12) to the UDHR, yet 
omits reference to consent or choice, potentially sanctioning state laws 
countenancing marriage without free consent:   “Men and women of 
16 Quila (ibid (n 4)) [9]. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 UDHR 1948, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/> accessed 21 April 
2014. 
20 ICCPR 1966 <http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx> 
accessed 21 April 2014. 
21 CEDAW 1979, <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/> accessed 21 
April 2014. 
22 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No 21 (13th session 1994), 
‘equality in marriage and family relations’ [16], 
<http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm#rec
om21> accessed 21 April 2014. 
23 ICESCR 1966,  
<https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?chapter=4&lang=en&mtdsg_no=i
v-3&src=treaty> accessed 21 April 2014. 
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marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according 
to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.”24 
It is also curious that arranged marriages are not seen to contradict full 
and free consent. Wilson LJ cites cultural expectations in conjunction with 
consent, as if culture or cultural imperatives remove a marriage from 
possible force or lack of consent. Yet the ICESCR explicitly mandates 
intending spouses’ free consent. Further, many marriages are arranged in 
conformity with the Secretary of State’s indicators for forced marriages.  
Notably, Wilson LJ sees forced marriages as not only denoting lack of 
free and full consent but having an additional factor of force,25 defined as 
including coercion by threats or by other psychological means. Yet none 
of the international instruments referring to marriage by consent says or 
implies lack of its full and free or free character must be by force, whether 
of the nature contemplated by Wilson LJ or not. Wilson LJ seems to posit 
two steps: prove lack of free and full consent; prove force and coercion, as 
if somehow the two are separate and distinct rather than necessarily part 
and parcel of the same design or proof. Surely force and coercion are not 
additional to a lack of full and free consent, but are what can make 
consent neither full nor free. Further, if an arrangement is negotiated by 
persons not being the parties to the marriage, this should at least raise a 
question – even a doubt - whether consent is full and freely given. Is 
consent in such circumstances real, or at least a query as to its reality 
required? 
Family law encapsulates these issues. That a distinction can be drawn 
with clarity or meaning between forced marriages and arranged marriages 
– if the determinant is full and free consent to wed - is demonstrably 
misleading. Yet despite contrary protestations, nullity cases in England 
and Wales and Australia (and originally Fiji) where duress is in issue 
ultimately rely on variations on force – consistent with Wilson LJ’s view 
in Quila. The notion that culture removes arranged marriages from 
categorisation as forced also impacts with fraud.  
 
NULLITY UNDER STATUTE 
 
The Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) recognises nullity “based on the 
ground that the marriage is void”: s 51 The Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) says 
24 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms, 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf> accessed 21 April 
2014. 
25 Quila (ibid (n 4)) [9]. 
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a marriage is void where consent of either party is not a real consent 
because: 
(i) it was obtained by duress or fraud; 
(ii) that party is mistaken as to the identity of the other party or as 
to the nature of the ceremony performed; or 
(iii) that party is mentally incapable of understanding the nature 
and effect of the marriage ceremony; …: s 23B(1)(d) 
 
Although Australia and Fiji refer to void and not voidable marriages, 
while the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (EW) refers to both, these 
provisions originate in common law. Matters akin to those covered by s 
23B (Marriage Act (Cth)) and s 32 (Family Law Act (Fiji)) come under s 
12 of the Matrimonial Causes Act (EW) as voidable: 
 
• either party has not consented to the marriage, by reference to 
duress, mistake, unsoundness of mind or otherwise, or capability 
for valid consent not lacking at time of marriage, but either party 
suffering from a mental disorder (per the Mental Health Act 1959 
(EWS)) of such kind or to such extent as to be unfitted for 
marriage; 
 
• the respondent suffers from communicable venereal disease at the 
time of the marriage, or is pregnant by a person other than the 
applicant. 
 
Focusing on duress and fraud, noting the (purported) forced and 
arranged marriages distinction, how are these provisions applied and what 
is the common law background continuing to influence outcomes? 
 
CONSENT, COERCION, FORCE AND DURESS 
 
Wilson LJ’s apparent contention (in Quila) that lack of consent must 
be proven with additional use of force obfuscates full and free consent and 
lack of it.  
Consent is: 
 
• “permission for something to happen or agreement to do 
something”;26 or  
 
• “to give assent or approval”;27 or  
26 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (5th edn, OUP 2002). 
27 Merriam Webster Dictionary (11th edn, Random House 2005). 
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• a “concurrence of wills” where: 
 
“Express consent is that directly given, either lira voce or in writing. 
Implied consent is manifested by signs, actions, or facts. Or by 
inaction or silence, which raise a presumption that consent has been 
given … It is an act of reason, accompanied with deliberation, the 
mind weighing as in a balance the good or evil on each side.” 28 
 
“Force” is defined as “compulsion, constraint or obligation to do 
something”; “driving or propelling against resistance”;29 “to bring about 
or effect by force” or “bring about of necessity or as a necessary result”; 
“to put or impose (something or someone) forcibly on or upon a 
person”;30 “to compel by force; overcome the resistance of”; “exertion or 
the use of exertion against a person or thing that resists; coercion.”31 
“Coercion” is “to make (someone) do something by using force or 
threats”; “to get (something) by using force or threats”;32 “to restrain or 
dominate by force”; “to compel to an act or choice”;33 “to achieve by 
force or threat”.34 “Duress” is “compulsion by threat or force, coercion, 
constraint”; “Law: such constraint or coercion as will render void a 
contract or other legal act entered or performed under its influence”;35 
“forcible restraint, especially imprisonment”.36 Synonyms include 
intimidation, pressure, bullying, browbeating.“Full and free” imports the 
notion that a party suffers no irresistible impediment or pressure on their 
will so as to overbear it. Contemporary nullity cases assert that overt force 
or threats of a physical nature are unnecessary. Yet Scott v Sebright37 
continues to be cited as leading authority. Butt J in this case asserts that 
for fraud and duress consent to marriage should be “tested and determined 
in precisely the same manner as … any other contract”, Butt J continued: 
 
“True it is that in contracts of marriage there is an interest 
involved above and beyond that of the immediate parties. Public 
policy requires that marriage should not be lightly set aside, and 
28 Black’s Law Dictionary (10th edn, Thomson West 2014). 
29 Random House Dictionary (Random House 2011). 
30 World English Dictionary (OUP 2012). 
31 Collins English Dictionary (11th edn, HarperCollins, Glasgow, 2011). 
32 Random House Dictionary (n 29). 
33 World English Dictionary (n 30). 
34 Collins English Dictionary (n 31). 
35 Random House Dictionary (n 29). 
36 Collins English Dictionary (n 31). 
37 (1886) 12 PD 21. 
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there is in some cases the strongest temptation to the parties more 
immediately interested to act in collusion in obtaining dissolution 
of the marriage tie. These reasons necessitate great care and 
circumspection on the part of the tribunal, but they in no wise alter 
the principle or the grounds on which this, like any other contract, 
may be avoided.”38 
 
Butt J went on to disagree that to avoid a contract entered into through 
fear “the fear must be such as would impel a person of ordinary courage 
and resolution to yield to it”, for: 
 
“Whenever from natural weakness of intellect or from fear – 
whether reasonably entertained or not – either party is actually in a 
state of mental incompetence to resist pressure improperly brought 
to bear, there is no more consent than in the case of a person of 
stronger intellect and more robust courage yielding to a more 
serious danger. The difficulty consists not in any uncertainty of the 
law on the subject, but in its application to the facts of each 
individual case.”39 
 
Butt J’s contention as to mental incompetency; his implication that 
duress or coercion must involve danger, even serious danger and fear; and 
his focus on prioritising “maintaining” marriage are troubling. Although 
appearing to be a concession to recognising different levels of capacity to 
resist pressure to consent, “mental incompetency” effectively does the 
opposite. At the very least it implies that the person (who is not of “more 
robust courage and stronger intellect”) must, to establish absence of 
consent, be lacking in “ordinary” mental capacity (“weakness of 
intellect”). Yet a person of ordinary mental capacity (and one robust, of 
stronger will or even “courage”) may well be overborne by religious or 
cultural expectations and filial duty, whether there is danger, “serious 
danger” or what might be accepted as fear in reaction to danger. In any 
event, incompetence of mind such as to impede a person’s capacity to 
understand the nature or effect of marriage or that s/he is participating in a 
marriage ceremony is now covered by a separate head: s 23B (d) (ii) and 
(iii) of the Matrimonial Causes Act (Cth), s 32(2) (d) (ii) and (iii) of the 
Family Law Act (Fiji), and s 12 of the Family Law Act (EW). Why import 
a mental incompetency requirement into duress or force? Even if done to 
expand the scope of force or duress it simply adds confusion. As for Butt 
J’s reference to policy, surely an equally compelling “interest … above 
38 Ibid [23] This is so for Canada, too: RH v RT 2011 BCSC 67. 
39 Ibid [23-24]. Similarly for Canada: RH v RT (ibid). 
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and beyond that of the immediate parties” is to make sure that no 
marriages are entered into without full and free consent. The policy 
requirement not to maintain such marriages must be just as important (or 
more so) a public interest as maintaining marriages entered into by full 
and free consent. This is the impetus behind concerns as to forced 
marriage – and arguably equally applicable to arranged marriages.40 
More recent cases purportedly abjure Scott v Sebright’s notion that 
duress must involve danger and fear. Hirani v Hirani41 is frequently cited. 
There, annulment was refused at first instance on the basis that duress 
asserted as applied by Ms Hirani’s parents was not duress as required by 
law. Nineteen at the time of the marriage, Ms Hirani was living in 
England with her parents, British Indian Hindus who objected to her 
association with Mr Hussain, a Muslim of Indian background. They 
arranged for her marriage to Mr Hirani whom she and her parents first met 
at the registry office. The threats directed to Ms Hirani and upon which 
she relied were articulated as: 
 
“You want to marry somebody who is strictly against our religion? 
He is a Muslim, you are a Hindu; you had better marry somebody 
we want you to, otherwise pack up your belongings and go. If you 
do not want to marry Mr Hirani and you want to marry Mr Husain, 
go.”42 
 
The Court accepted that leaving the family home meant Ms Hirani had 
“no place to go and no means of supporting herself at that age and in those 
circumstances”, and “in spite of her opposition, ... was forced to go 
through with the civil ceremony”.43 Consistent with Hindu tradition, she 
returned to her parents’ home, going to live with Mr Hirani after the 
religious/traditional ceremony some six weeks later. Ms Hirani’s evidence 
was that she “was crying all the way through” the ceremony and “was 
utterly miserable”.44 She lived with Mr Hirani for six weeks, not engaging 
in sexual intercourse with him. Upon leaving, she went to Mr Hussain. 
Granting the appeal and annulment, Ormrod LJ said it was not necessary 
to find a threat to life, limb or liberty to establish duress, the key question 
being “whether threats or pressure were such as to overbear” the 
40 As to arranged marriages see further below. 
41 [1982] EWCA Civ 1, [1983] 4 FLR 232. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
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individual’s will, destroying the reality of consent.45 Whatever form 
duress takes, “it must involve coercion of the will so as to vitiate 
consent”.46 The threats and pressure employed by Ms Hirani’s parents 
“clearly overbore her will”, invalidating or vitiating consent.47 
This contests Szechter v Szechter48 where threat to life, limb or liberty 
was the criterion by which reality of consent should be measured.49 Yet 
shortly before Hirani, Singh v Kaur50 reiterated this standard, saying a 
lack of threats to life, limb or liberty meant the nullity application was 
rightly refused, relying on Singh v Singh.51 In the latter, Ms Singh was 17 
years when undergoing a civil marriage ceremony, never having met the 
man previously. Being Sikh, the coercion she related was religion, custom 
and duty to her parents. This was considered inadequate to vitiate consent. 
In the former, whilst in India, a 21-year-old who from four years of age 
had lived in England was told by his parents that refusing to marry the 
partner they had chosen would bring shame upon the family and he would 
be disowned – banned from the family home and family business. His 
contention that emotional coercion vitiated consent was not accepted as 
life, limb or liberty threatening. 
Nonetheless, in NH v MI,52 Munby J observed it is “no longer the law, 
if it ever was”, that marriage was voidable for duress “only if ... there was 
threat of immediate danger to life, limb or liberty …”53 Yet NH v MI 
ultimately hung upon facts clearly showing extreme force and threats:  
45 Ibid 2-3. 
46 Ibid 3. 
47 Ibid. 
48 [1971] P 286. 
49 Ibid 297-98. 
50 [1981] FamLaw 152. 
51 [1971] P 226. 
52 [2006] EWHC 1646 (Fam). 
53 Ibid [27], citing Szechter ibid (n 48)), Singh v Singh (ibid (n 52)) and Singh v 
Kaur (ibid (n 51)) as support for the earlier position, and Hirani (ibid (n 41)) as 
the ‘new’ position. For a view on the situation in Australia, where the authors 
assert a ‘disjuncture between domestic legal and political responses to forced 
marriage faced by nationals of Western states with the response of refugee law to 
forced marriages occurring elsewhere’ see Catherine Dauvergne and Jenni 
Millbank, ‘Forced Marriage as a Harm in Domestic and International Law’ 
(2010) 73 (1) MLR  
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstratct_id=1563842> accessed 2 May 
2014. As the present article confirms, Dauvergne and Millbank attribute greater 
latitude in nullity applications than exists in practice. See also Frances Simmons 
and Jennifer Burn, ‘Without Consent: Forced Marriage in Australia’ (2012) 36 
Melbourne University Law Review 970. Similarly for the UK, David Bradley, 
‘Duress and Arranged Marriages’ (1983) 46 MLR 499; A Bradney, ‘Duress, 
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• Living in England since her birth, NH was taken to Pakistan 
shortly after her sixteenth birthday, ostensibly a holiday her 
parents assured her was not for the purpose of marriage; 
• Her expectation (based on parental assurances) of returning to 
England two months later went unfulfilled: NH was kept in 
Pakistan by relatives, until at 17 years she underwent a marriage 
ceremony with her 17-year-old cousin; 
• Between arriving in Pakistan and marriage, realising or at least 
concerned marriage was planned, NH constantly telephoned her 
parents, particularly her mother, for clarification, begging to 
return to England; 
• Her mother prevaricated, saying her father would be arriving and 
NH should remain to be in Pakistan with her father; 
• Eventually her mother confirmed marriage as the purpose, her 
cousin the chosen partner (her mother’s brother’s son); 
• NH’s boyfriend sent his parents to ask for her hand in marriage, 
creating disturbance amongst the relatives and consternation for 
her parents, who threatened suicide if she refused to marry the 
cousin;  
• Her parents told NH she would not be allowed to return to 
England unless she participated in the marriage; 
• After the marriage, NH lived in the cousin’s household without 
intercourse occurring, and signed documents only when her 
mother said she would not be allowed to return to England 
without signing. 
 
At minimum, being held against her will – false imprisonment or 
kidnapping – comes within the strictures of threat to life, limb or liberty. 
This is a common pattern. First, court assertions that such extreme 
coercion is not required. Then, nullity granted on coercion fulfilling the 
“old” – said to be obsolete – standard. Hirani exhibits this – being 
“thrown on the street” at 17 years, disowned by family, without financial 
resources. 
 
 
Family Law and the Coherent Legal System’ (1994) 57 (6) MLR 963; Anne 
Phillips and Moira Dustin, ‘UK initiatives on forced marriage: regulation, 
dialogue and exit’ (2004) 52 (3) Political Studies 531 and Canada, Bruce Ziff, 
‘Recent Developments in Marriage and Divorce’ (1986) 18 Ottawa Law Review 
21. 
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AUSTRALIAN CASES 
 
Australian cases reiterate that life, limb and liberty need not be 
threatened or at stake. Yet again nullity is granted where clear threats or 
physical force, kidnapping or false imprisonment and the like exist. Cases 
where these are not present, yet nullity is granted, are elusive.54 In the 
Marriage of S55 is cited as leading authority. Ms S arrived in Australia 
with her family from Egypt. At 16, she married in a Coptic Orthodox 
Church. Her evidence was that the marriage took place against her will, 
under parental pressure: 
 
“... right up to the time of the ceremony I still did not want to go 
through with it. My parents … insisted I go through with it and I 
could not stand up against them.”56 
 
Watson J held she was “caught in a psychological prison of family 
loyalty, parental concern, sibling responsibility, religious commitment and 
a culture [demanding] filial obedience” and, if having “no consenting 
will”, it was “because these matters were operative – not threats, violence, 
imprisonment or psychological constraint”. 57 
Referring to Scott v Sebright and Cooper (falsely called Crane) v 
Crane,58 Watson J said the emphasis in some judgments “on fear and 
terror … seems unnecessarily limiting” because: 
 
“A sense of mental oppression can be generated by causes other 
than fear or terror. If … circumstances … taken together lead to 
the conclusion that because of oppression a particular person has 
not exercised a voluntary consent to a marriage, that consent is 
vitiated by duress and is not a real consent. This is so howsoever 
the oppression arises and irrespective of the motivation or 
propriety of any person solely or partially responsible for the 
oppression.”59 
 
54 See further ‘Culture, Force and Fraud’, re Nagri & Chapal [2012] FamCA 464 
(1 June 2012). 
55 (1980) 42 FLR 94. 
56 Ibid 98-99. 
57 Ibid 103. 
58 (1981) P 369. 
59 In the Marriage of S, (ibid (n 55)) 104. 
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The effect of oppression on the individual’s mind, not the form of 
oppression (whether constraint, threat or otherwise), “should be the 
operative factor” and: 
 
“… I cannot see how I can read down the natural and ordinary 
meaning of “duress” as equated to oppression or “coercion” to 
such a degree that there is to be no annulment where the lack of 
real consent arises from non-violent but nevertheless controlling 
parental coercion.”60 
 
Not insignificantly, Ms S was 16 at the time of the marriage, 
economically dependent upon and living at home with her parents, 
paralleling Hirani. Even if Ms S were not orally threatened with being 
evicted from the family home and disowned, this was at least implicit. 
Thus in practical terms the Scott v Sebright approach persists. If this were 
not so, reported grants of nullity on the basis of religious and cultural 
imposition or pressure and filial duty without additional pressures such as 
economic dependency would be in evidence.  
In referring as it does to oppression as interfering with “voluntary 
consent” In the Marriage of S endeavours to position duress in a context 
admitting of imposition comprehending more than narrow notions of force 
or threat of force. Yet cases citing In the Marriage of S ultimately 
generally rely upon far greater explication of coercion or duress, often 
continuing to refer to Scott v Sebright and Cooper v Crane.61 Take, for 
example, Zoumaris & Paradisio.62 The facts properly led to a refusal of 
nullity. However, despite giving a nod to In the Marriage of S, Burr J 
said: 
 
“Duress requires the consent of one party to have been obtained by 
force or threat of force. It is not sufficient for the strong will of 
one to have imposed on the will of a weak or impressionable 
character …”63 
 
This recurs time and again, with duress or coercion applied by 
reference to physical or threated physical assault or constraint including 
60 Ibid. 
61 See further on Cooper v Crane (ibid n 58) under fraud, supra. 
62 [2008] FamCA 688 (1 August 2008). 
63 Ibid [24].  
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kidnapping or false imprisonment (often with passport confiscation), 
similar threats, or threats of parental suicide – as in Hirani.64  
Kreet & Sampir65 is typical. Ms Kreet was born in Australia. Her 
parents came to Australia from India, remaining “closely connected to 
[that] country’s culture … strict in that regard and … strongly against 
much of Australian culture.”66 Ms Kreet could not cut her hair or wear 
skirts or dresses apart from school uniform. Then: 
 
• Meeting Mr U through social media, she concealed the 
relationship from her parents until a year later. Unhappy, her 
parents said she could not marry Mr U, demanding she cease that 
contact and threatening an arranged marriage for her in India if 
she refused. Mr Kreet kept her from school, confiscated her 
mobile phone, and stopped her internet access.  
 
• The relationship continued.  Ms Kreet’s father said he was 
considering wedding proposals notified to him by her Indian 
uncle and, once 18, she would go to India with him for an 
arranged marriage and “appropriate suitor”.  
 
• Following November 2008 final examinations, Ms Kreet removed 
to Melbourne to live with Mr U. Her parents reported her as 
“missing”, repeatedly telephoning her to persuade her return. Her 
statutory declaration ended the police investigation, confirming 
she was in Melbourne of her own free will. Her parents travelled 
to Melbourne, advising her that once 18 she could marry Mr U. 
He and Ms Kreet participated in an “engagement ceremony” in 
Ms Kreet’s parent’s presence, which Ms Kreet termed a 
“proclamation in front of God”67 that she would marry Mr U. 
 
• Back in Sydney, Ms Kreet was assailed by her parents’ efforts to 
persuade her to end the relationship with Mr U. Mr Kreet made 
64 Rees J in Tirta & Lim [2012] FamCA 63 (23 February 2012) sees “difficulty 
[as arising] in the past … where, for example, the other party had threatened to 
commit suicide”: 6. A suicide threat by the other party was not accepted as duress 
in Kecskemethy (Otherwise Magyar) v Magyar (1961) 2 FLR 437 where he 
showed the putative marriage partner bloody clothing as ‘evidence’. The threat 
occurred sometime before the marriage; however Ms Kecskemethy said fear for 
Mr Magyar’s life was continuing, motivating her consent.  
65 [2011] FAMCA 22. 
66 Ibid [9]. 
67 Ibid [15]. 
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direct threats to Mr U that he would kidnap and rape Mr U’s 
mother and sisters. In early 2009, he slapped his daughter’s face 
on two occasions and struck her on the back. Ms Kreet returned to 
Melbourne, advising police that she was living with Mr U freely. 
 
• Ms Kreet’s parents flew to Melbourne, persuading her to return to 
Sydney. Apologising and asking her to forgive them, they offered 
a “proper wedding” to Mr U in India for her eighteenth birthday. 
Mr U went to Sydney to discuss wedding plans. Ms Kreet agreed 
to a traditional wedding with Mr U in India.  
 
• In India, her parents confiscated Ms Kreet’s passport, denied her 
telephone rights with Mr U, and concluded discussions about 
“suitable husbands” by providing one whereupon Ms Kreet’s 
refusal was met with Mr Kreet’s repeated threat to rape and 
kidnap Mr U.’s mother and sisters.  
 
• Thus arranged, the marriage went ahead. 
 
Again, coercion or duress included physical assault, confinement and 
threats. Notably, too, the applicant/petitioner’s youth is a central feature. 
This and the risk of economic survival parallels Hirani and In the 
Marriage of S. Hence the question whether more than lip service is paid to 
filial duty, cultural imposition and religious factors in arranged marriages. 
What of these factors in fraud and arranged marriage?  
 
FRAUD AND CONSENT – MOSS v MOSS 
 
Fraud nullity cases return to Moss v Moss (Otherwise Archer),68 Scott 
v Sebright and Cooper (falsely called Crane) v Crane. Post-dating them, 
Australian, English and Fijian statutory provisions set out explicitly some 
circumstances these authorities discuss under fraud generally. The insight 
provided is instructive. 
Involving pregnancy concealed at time of marriage, in Moss fraud is 
considered in two aspects:  
 
• impersonation leading a party to marry another, not realising that 
that other is not the actual person (physical person) s/he believes 
is the contracting party; and  
68 [1897] P 263. 
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• deliberate inducement of a person with a disability – expressed as 
“feeble minded” – to marry. 
 
Mr Moss married, not at the time (fully) realising his bride was 
pregnant to another man. Ms Archer, the bride, hid this from Mr Moss. 
Originally meeting when both were in service, Ms Archer and Mr Moss 
re-met in 1895, thereafter seeing one another occasionally. In mid-1896 at 
her father’s house, she “pressed” Mr Moss to marry her. He agreed. Later 
that year, at the wedding, his “suspicions for the first time aroused”, Mr 
Moss “taxed [her] with being pregnant”.69 She denied it. A week or so 
later, confessing to the pregnancy, Ms Archer (now Moss) alleged the 
putative father had seduced her. Mr Moss left. A month later, the child 
was born. The Court accepted that at the time of marriage Mr Moss “did 
not know of his wife’s condition”, having “no grounds” for inquiring “as 
to her character”70. 
Counsel “for” pregnancy concealment as fraud vitiating consent 
contended:71 
 
• no English court decision addressed a prospective wife’s 
concealment of pregnancy from the intended husband at time of 
marriage as a nullity ground; 
• nonetheless the facts fell “within the principle of law [avoiding] a 
contract on the ground that consent of [a party was] obtained by 
fraud”;  
• a marriage contact’s validity is “dependent upon the same 
considerations” as any other contract’s validity, to be “tested in 
the same way”; 
• both parties’ consent is mandatory, being consent with 
“knowledge on their part of all material facts”; 
• “a material fact was suppressed” by the intending wife; 
• her conduct was a fraud on the husband, any child born in 
wedlock being presumed his, requiring him to “support another 
man’s child”; 
• pregnancy at time of marriage “rendered [Ms Archer] incapable 
… of bearing a child to her husband” at that time and, through 
concealment, was a fraud on “essentials of the marriage relation”; 
• US authority establishes by Reynolds v Reynolds72 “clear law that 
concealed pregnancy is a ground of nullity”, and by Donovan v 
69 Ibid 265.  
70 Ibid 266. 
71 Ibid 266-267. 
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Donovan73 that a wife’s “express representation of chastity” 
before marriage is unnecessary.  
 
Counsel contesting fraud said:74 
 
• all essentials of a valid marriage contract were present – 
intelligent consent, free agency, complete age and physical 
capacity, and statutory compliance; 
• fraud is a ground for nullity only where “of such a nature as to be 
inconsistent with the idea of … a real and intelligent consent” by 
a party; 
• although based on the parties’ contract, marriage “is not merely a 
contract in the ordinary legal sense of the term”, as creating a 
status: Niboyet v Niboyet75 per Brett, LJ; Sottomayer v De 
Barros,76 per Lord Hannen; 
• the wife being “under the circumstances incapable of bearing 
children to her husband” is countered, this being “at most a 
temporary disability”; 
• the US decisions conflict with English law and should not be 
followed.  
 
Jeune P refused nullity: lacking precedent it “would be impossible … , 
at the present day” to endorse a principle “of such importance and so far-
reaching.”77  
On identity fraud, he cited Swift v Kelly78: absent explicit statutory 
provisions “requiring certain things to be done in a specific manner”, a 
marriage contracted on false representations, where “but for such 
contrivances, consent never would have been obtained” could not be held 
void: 
 
“Unless the party imposed upon has been deceived as to the 
person, … thus [giving] no consent at all, there is no degree of 
72 85 Mass (3 Allen) 6-05 (1892). 
73 91 Mass (9 Allen) 140 (1864). 
74 Moss (ibid (n 68)) 265. 
75 (1815) 3 M&S 537. 
76 (1879) 5 PD 94, 101. 
77 Moss (ibid (n 68)) 267. 
78 (1835) 3 Knapp 257. 
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deception which can be available to set aside a contract of 
marriage knowingly made.”79  
 
Marriage contracts were distinguished from ordinary commercial 
contracts, marriage being “a civil contract and a religious vow” parties are 
not entitled to dissolve of their own volition.80 This tends to Munby J’s 
public interest or public policy argument in NS v MI. 
Moss limits (in ways applicable neither to the Australian, Fiji nor 
current UK position) the grounds upon which marriage can be annulled. 
Setting this out in detail is essential to understanding fraud in present law, 
consistent with relevant statutory provisions. In Moss, Jeune P pinpointed 
the need for: 
 
• both parties’ voluntary consent; 
• compliance with legal requirements of publication and 
solemnisation, so far as law deems essential; 
• no incapacity in parties either by age, physical capacity or 
relationship by blood or marriage. 
 
He said failure in those respects, but (he believed) in no others served 
to render a marriage void or voidable: 
 
“It has been repeatedly stated that a marriage may be declared null 
on the ground of fraud or duress. But, on examination, it will be 
found that it is only a way of amplifying the proposition long ago 
laid down … that the voluntary consent of the parties is 
required.”81 
 
As with any other contract, duress in marriage contracts is, Jeune P 
said, “an absence of a consenting will”, and with fraud, this “does not 
include such fraud as induces a consent, but is limited to [that procuring] 
the appearance without the reality of consent”:82 
 
• the most simple instance is personation, or as per Lord 
Ellenborough in Rex v Burton-on-Trent83, adopting another name 
for concealment vis-a-vis the putative marriage partner; or 
 
79 Ibid 293. 
80 Moss (ibid (n 68)) 267. 
81 Moss (ibid (n 68)) 268, citing Fulwood’s case (1638) Cro Car 482, 488, 493. 
82 Ibid (n 68). 
83 (1869) 3 M&S 537. 
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• taking advantage of a “weak” though not “absolutely insane” 
mind to induce entry into a contract despite a party’s lack of 
understanding: Portsmouth v Portsmouth84, Harrod v Harrod.85  
 
In all cases where fraud constitutes a marriage nullity ground indicates 
procurement of agreement by form without substance. Annulment flows 
not because fraud is present, but because consent is absent: 
 
“This is illustrated by the imaginary case suggested … in Reg v 
Mills86 of a mock marriage in a masquerade where the kind of 
result … fraud might have produced would be produced by 
mistake. [There], there would be no fraud, but for want of real 
consent the marriage would be declared void. But when there is 
consent no fraud inducing that consent is material.”87 
 
Referring to Wakefield v Mackay88 Jeune P noted similar, more recent 
cases where error as to family or fortune procured by “disingenuous 
representation” cannot contradict marriage validity, for “no disparity of 
fortune or mistake [of] qualities of the person” can impeach “the vinculum 
of marriage”:89  
 
“The strongest case [established] of the most deliberate plot, 
leading to a marriage the most unseemly in all disproportions of 
rank, of fortune, of habits of life, and even of age itself, would not 
[release] from claims which though forged by others, he had 
riveted on himself. If he is capable of consent and has consented, 
the law does not ask how the consent has been induced.”90 
 
Scott v Sebright is often cited for a broader nullity concept. This Moss 
explains as a misreading: it was “a case of deception and force acting on a 
weakened mind”, simply establishing that for marriage, as for other 
contracts, fraud and duress may “render an apparent consent in truth no 
84 1 Hagg Ecc 355. 
85 (1854) 1 K&J 4. 
86 (1844) 10 Cl&F 534, 785. 
87 Moss (n 68) 268-69. 
88 1 Phillim 134, n 137. 
89 Moss (ibid (n 68)) 269 citing Ewing v Whatley 2 Hagg Cons 175, 183. 
90 Moss (ibid (n 68)) 269-270 citing Sullivan v Sullivan (1818) 2 Hagg Cons 283, 
284. 
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consent at all”.91 Moss thus seeks to establish within its own parameters 
what was said in Scott v Sebright, namely that courts refuse to “recognise 
as binding contacts [where] consent of either party [is] obtained by fraud 
or duress”, and the validity of a contract of marriage must be tested and 
determined in precisely the same manner as that of any other contract.92 
 
WHAT THEN OF THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS? FRAUD AND 
CONSENT BY STATUTE 
 
Moss says marriage can be annulled only where there is no consent: 
however or by whatever means induced, consent makes a marriage valid. 
Statute law puts it differently. The Matrimonial Causes Act (EW) diverges 
from the Family Law Act (Fiji) and Marriage Act (Cth), which explicitly 
include “fraud”. However, the EW Act refers to “valid consent”, listing all 
matters for a void or voidable determination. The Australian and Fiji Acts 
refer to “consent” that is “not a real consent”, listing specifics: s 32(2) (d), 
s 23B (1)(d) 
The distinction matters.  
First, to Moss where nullity must be based on: 
 
• no incapacity in the parties to marry – including age, physical 
capability or relationship by blood or marriage; 
• no absence of a consenting will; 
• fraud limited to that procuring an appearance of consent, without 
reality, including: 
o personation; 
o assumed name for concealment from putative partner; 
o advantage taken of a mind “not absolutely insane, but 
weak”, to induce entry into a contract the party “did not 
understand”; 
o procuring form without substance of agreement not by 
fraud, but by absence of consent (citing personation, 
assuming a name, taking advantage of a weak mind); 
o mock marriage or masquerade.93  
 
Frauds not qualifying for nullity include: 
 
• disparity of fortune or mistake as to the person’s qualities; 
91 Moss (ibid (n 68)) 270. 
92 Moss (ibid (n 68)) 270-71. 
93 Moss (ibid (n 68)) 268-69. 
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• a “most deliberate plot, leading to marriage most unseemly in 
disproportion of rank, fortune, habits of life, even age”.94  
 
Then to statute law. In Australia and Fiji, those matters specified by 
Moss are covered explicitly: 
 
• identity mistake; 
• nature of the ceremony mistake; 
• mental incapacity as to understanding nature and effect of the 
ceremony: s 32(2)(d)(ii)(iii) Fiji, s 23B(1)(c)(ii)(iii) Australia 
 
As fraud remains a separate head (s 32(2)(d)(i) Family Law Act (Fiji), 
s 23B(1)(d)(i) Marriage Act (Cth), it must have a meaning beyond these.  
 
The Family Law Act (EW) references unsoundness of mind, mistake, 
venereal disease, pregnancy and gender identity. Are the listed matters 
intended to be exhaustive? Fraud could come under “otherwise”:  
 
That either party to the marriage did not validly consent to it, 
whether in consequence of duress, mistake, unsoundness of mind 
or otherwise: s 129(c) 
 
The question is what are “fraud” (in Australia and Fiji) and 
“otherwise” (EW) designed to cover? 
In Australia, In the Marriage of Nemer Osman Husband and Oula 
Mourrali Wife Suit95 refers to Moss and Deniz and Deniz.96 In Deniz, a 
Turkish national accepted by the Court as lacking any intention 
whatsoever of cohabiting, persuaded an Australian schoolgirl of Lebanese 
descent to marry him, aiming solely to secure permanent residency. 
Holding fraud not to be limited to identity or nature of the ceremony, the 
Court granted the annulment. A distinction was drawn between consent 
gained through a fraudulent representation by the respondent as to living 
with an applicant as husband and wife as opposed to a fraudulent 
representation that the respondent had riches, good-looks, virtue, health or 
any such “inducing equality”. 
Osman v Mourrali97 and Otway and Otway98 rejected Deniz, 
conforming to the traditional view. Yet that cannot be right: with 
94 Moss (ibid (n 68)) 269-70. 
95 [1989] FamCA 78 (17 November 1989), (1990) FLC ¶92-111. 
96 (1977) FLC ¶90-252. 
97 [1989] FamCA 78 (17 November 1989), (1990) FLC ¶92-111. 
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“identity” and “nature of the ceremony” explicitly covered under section 
23, that would render otiose the explicit reference to fraud.  
Nevertheless, Fiji initially adopted the same approach. In MPL v 
JSG99 Pulea CJ refused a nullity application where an arranged marriage 
was initiated by JSG’s father. Asking whether JSC had married previously 
and “[is] there anything I won’t be happy with?” MPL’s father was told 
JSG had never married and “my son is very good and that is why I came 
and asked for your daughter’s hand”.100 
Within two weeks of completed marriage negotiations the parties 
married. The husband then returned to Aotearoa/New Zealand, MPL and 
her family in Fiji hearing nothing more from him. By telephone, the 
fathers planned the traditional religious wedding. Then, according to 
MPL’s father: 
 
“[JSG’s father] called me … and I was preparing everything as it 
was coming near to … the ceremonial wedding and he said: ‘I 
have some bad news …’ He said: ‘Why can’t you shift the 
marriage.’ I asked … why and he told me his son was involved in 
a drug case and ‘he takes drugs a lot. He is not staying with me 
anymore… he does not listen to [me].’”101 
 
The drug problem arose at no time during marriage negotiations or on 
the wedding day, with repeated assurance of JSG’s being “a good boy and 
hard working. He will look after your daughter very well …”102 
Arguing fraud under s 32(2)(d)(i), MPL’s father said consent would 
never have been given, had the drug problem been known. Relying on 
Moss, In the Marriage of Hosking, RG and Hosking, JH103 and Osman 
and Mourrali, Pulea J refused nullity, observing that in each case the basis 
for declaring marriage “null” for fraud does not include fraud inducing 
consent. Citing Hosking and Moss she said fraudulent misrepresentations 
of the quality of a person or future intentions “have never been regarded 
as sufficient to annul a marriage.”104 
Observing that, “consent and fraud” principles being “grounded in a 
long list of authorities” and having “developed over the years.” Pulea J 
said there should be no extension to “deliberate withholding of 
98 (1977) FLC ¶90-807. 
99 FHC Case No. 1182/2006 (15 February 2007). 
100 Ibid 2. 
101 Ibid 4. 
102 Ibid 4. 
103 [1994] FamCA 87, (1995) FC ¶92-579. 
104 MPL v JSG (ibid (n 99)) 11. 
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information [here, the] drug problem and misrepresentation.”105 The 
alternative “would appear to be so wide as to cover any situation 
[involving] lack of information of the conduct, character and 
circumstances” of a putative partner.106 Echoing Jeune P in Moss she said 
that introducing “a new principle not resident on any sound basis” would 
prompt development “in several directions, [giving] rise to many doubts 
and much confusion.”107 
Albeit sympathising with MPL, Pulea J said nullity fraud did not 
include misrepresentation and concealed misconduct: 
 
“In Swift v Kelly (1835) Knapp 257 the Court held: ‘… no 
marriage shall be held void merely upon proof that it had been 
contacted upon false representations and that for such 
contrivances, consent would never have been obtained.’ In 
Hosking v Hosking (1995), p. 81,750, the Court concluded that the 
term ‘fraud’ as it appears in s. 23B (1) (d) of the Marriage Act 
[1961] (Cth) has a fairly limited scope. Its concern is with fraud as 
to the identity of the other party or as to the nature of the 
ceremony, and not to the motives of a party in entering into the 
marriage.”108  
 
Yet motive is not the issue. Section 32(2) (d) (i) is directed to what, 
when “consenting,” is the mind of the person alleging fraud, and the 
nature of that fraud. All manner of matters may be the subject of pretence 
or misunderstanding, misrepresentation or mistake and lack of meeting of 
minds when parties court and marry. All cannot go to fraud within the 
meaning of s 32(2) (d) (i) and its Australian equivalent. However, some 
may.  
Cases are inconsistent. Courts in England and Wales and Australia (as 
in the US – see Moss) vary in approach. Sullivan v Sullivan (Falsely 
called Oldacre)109 lists “fraud” not vitiating marital consent: (false) 
representations of money – or exaggerating the prospective partner’s 
wealth, (mis)representing class or status, concealing a drug or drink habit. 
These may distress the party discovering the truth after marriage; however 
none goes directly to appurtenances of marriage. Similarly, assurances 
that an intended marriage partner is “a good boy” (or “man”). 
105 MPL v JSG (ibid (n 99)). 
106 MPL v JSG (ibid (n 99)). 
107 MPL v JSG (ibid (n 99)) 11-12. 
108 MPL v JSG (ibid (n 99)) 12. 
109 (1818) 2 Hag Con 238, 161 ER 728, (1807) 3 M&S 265n, 105 ER 610. 
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Australia swings between a narrow and more liberal view, some 
obvious in outcome, some less so. In the Marriage of Otway EJ and 
Otway, G110 is clear-cut. Four days after the wedding, Ms Otway 
acknowledged she had married only because the man she truly wanted to 
marry had said he wanted a de facto relationship. After two and a half 
years, Ms Otway followed that man interstate, eventually living with him. 
Applying for nullity, Mr Otway argued she had wanted Australian 
residency to remain Australia and resume her relationship with the other 
man.  
Fraud was ruled out. Each had consented freely, despite Ms Otway’s 
ulterior design unknown to Mr Otway at the wedding. There was no 
mistaken identity or mistake as to the ceremony or meaning of marriage. 
Most significantly, having lived as husband and wife, presenting as 
married and undertaking “couple” activities for 2½ years, it was “drawing 
a long bow to contend the marriage could be annulled by fraud”.111 Mr 
Otway’s route was dissolution. 
In Osman and Mourrali,112 Mr Osman said, after the ceremony: “I 
don’t want to marry you, the whole purpose of the marriage contract was 
to obtain residency.”113 One month later, he emphasised to Ms Mourrali’s 
mother that he did not wish to marry Ms Mourrali. Then by telephone he 
was alleged to have said to Ms Mourrali’s mother that he was “no longer 
interested in marrying her daughter because he had ‘legal residence’”.114 
Mr Osman admitted that conversation, saying he had said he no longer 
wished to marry Ms Mourrali however he was angry when Ms Mourrali’s 
mother abused him. He claimed the marriage ended because Ms Mourrali 
assumed he was far wealthier and, discovering her mistake, she “lost 
interest in the marriage and would not proceed.”115 
Nygh J reviewed the history and principles of nullity fraud. 
Canvassing fellow judges, he found immigration fraud applications to be 
“relatively common”, some annulments being granted, others refused 
when judges followed the “traditional view”. Nygh J acknowledged 
having once granted an undefended application, saying he stressed at the 
time that light of there having been no argument, this should not be seen 
as a precedent for:  
 
110 (1987) FLC ¶91-807l. 
111 Ibid. 
112 [1989] FamCA 78 (17 November 1989), (1990) FLC ¶92-111. 
113 Ibid 77,741. 
114 Ibid. The references to ‘marry’ here are discussed further under ‘Duress and 
Fraud in Forced and “Arranged” Marriage’, supra. 
115 Ibid 77,741. 
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“…[I]f a person wishes to go through a ceremony of marriage with 
[one] whose identity he or she is aware of, then it matters not that 
that consent is induced by promises of eternal happiness, luxurious 
living or even the promise to live together for ever after. For, if … 
a marriage could be annulled on the ground that a party was 
defrauded as to the intention to cohabit, where should the court 
draw the line? Love and affection are also regarded as essential to 
a marriage at least in the twentieth century: would lack of love 
base an application for annulment? Again, the production of 
offspring is a traditional concern of marriage, would a deception 
as to the intention to bear them or procreate them found an 
application? Where does one draw the line between attributes such 
as wealth, virtue, beauty or potency on the one hand and the 
fundamentals of marriage such as cohabitation, mutual love and 
support and the procreation of children of the parties?”116 
 
Noting the English approach, inherited by Australia, where marriage 
would be valid despite neither party’s intending to cohabit, he located in 
inheritance, property and “dynastic relationships” this “peculiarity” of 
English law not existing elsewhere in the world: 
 
“[A] distinguished historical line of Englishmen from the monarch 
downwards would have been loath to have their marriages 
annulled if an intention to cohabit had been of the essence! If 
cohabitation is not of the essence where neither party desires it, 
how can it then become of the essence if only one party seeks 
it?”117  
Nygh J relied also on changing social mores. He said changes to 
divorce “strengthened” the decision to refuse nullity, for annulment had 
“some attractions” when divorce was “difficult” and viewed as “socially 
shameful”. Now, with dissolution following one year’s separation without 
any investigation “nor guilt” produces no stigma. Being so easily 
established, had she sought divorce Ms Osman “would have been relieved 
far more expeditiously and cheaply from her bonds some time ago.”118 
Yet just as Pulea J’s reference to “motive” was misplaced, so too with 
Nygh J: the issue is not changing social mores or shame removed from 
divorce. The question is whether or not there is fraud interfering with the 
116 Ibid77,742-77,743. 
117 Ibid 77,743. 
118 Ibid 77,743-744. 
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reality of consent. This rests upon the particular facts of the particular 
case, and all the circumstances. 
 
FRAUD IN FORCED AND ‘ARRANGED’ MARRIAGES 
 
In Australia, dispute revolves around Deniz, which has created a line 
of authority generally departing from it. Statute law, Deniz held, excluded 
ecclesiastical principles limiting fraud to identity or the nature of the 
ceremony. Osman and Mourrali criticised this. Yet the critique is difficult 
to fathom in light of the legislation. The Court in Deniz said fraud in the 
Matrimonial Causes Act and its successors, the Family Law Act and 
Marriage Act, must mean something more than duress. Otherwise it 
constitutes “mere surplusage” lacking effective meaning.119 Osman and 
Mourrali responded with a resounding “no”.120 In the Marriage of Otway 
endeavoured to address the problem by asserting that the Marriage Act 
provisions did “little more” than put into “statutory form” the law as “then 
understood”, without liberalising or expanding the meaning of fraud.121 
The Court contended that retaining fraud whilst explicitly referring to 
mistake as to identity and the nature or effect of the ceremony was simply 
a clarification of the reality that an “innocent” as well as a “fraudulent” 
mistake could result in the “relevant” lack of consent to a marriage. Yet 
why does the legislation not say so? Both types of mistake are left open as 
to “innocence” or “deceit”, meaning that under the Marriage Act (Cth) s 
23B(ii) and (iii) a court could include either innocent or duplicitous 
concealment on the part of a party. If the intention is to cover both, again 
there is no need for retaining fraud in s 23B(i).  
 
Legislative interpretation matters.  
 
As well as ignoring the existence of fraud as a head separate from 
questions of identity and nature or effect of the ceremony, or accepting the 
attempted distinction made in In the Marriage of Otway, Osman and 
Mourrali and its followers ignore “or” in s 23B(1)(d)(i) – “duress or 
fraud” – collapsing duress and fraud or making fraud hang upon some 
element or elements of duress. The contention is that somehow fraud and 
duress should be considered together, or are part and parcel of one way 
(rather than two ways) annulment may be recognised, or consent seen as 
inoperative or invalid. Yet “or” has legislative interpretation on its side as 
119 (1977) FLC ¶90-252. 
120 [1989] FamCA 78 (17 November 1989), (1990) FLC ¶92-111 at 76, 354. 
121 (1818) 2 Hag Con 238, 161 ER 728, (1807) 3 M&S 265n, 105 ER 610.What 
the Court meant by ‘little more’ rather than ‘only’ remains unexplained.  
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creating or indicating alternatives. It also confirms a parliamentary 
intention to introduce a disjunction: fraud is not limited by duress. Fraud 
and duress are independent or separate heads by reference to which 
annulment can be determined and upon which it can be founded. Ignoring 
s. 23B(1)(i) fraud completely by saying it is limited to s 23B(d)(ii) or (iii) 
situations is equally wrong. 
In Deniz the Court sought to adumbrate possible instances of fraud 
vitiating consent, applying a secular and contemporary perspective. Hence 
the approach was similar to that in Sullivan although pointing to the 
positive – what is fraud, rather than to the negative – what is not fraud. 
The Court acknowledged a lack of reported cases, concluding an 
apparent reluctance to set down principles or guidelines may arise from 
perceived difficulty in providing “proper safeguards”: 
 
“For instance, there would be general consternation if an 
application was granted on the basis of fraud by reason of one 
party deceiving the other as to being possessed of natural teeth. 
The case of the person who marries to gain money, rank or title as 
distinct from the more usually professed reasons would also cause 
concern. Clearly the fraud relied on must be one which goes to the 
root of the marriage contract.”122 
 
Quite rightly, it cannot be up to individual participants to decide what 
goes “to the root of the marriage contact.” This must be determined by 
courts referable to legislation and parliamentary debates. Deniz applied to 
the specific facts and recognised the need to interpret “fraud” consistent 
with safeguards against fanciful or inappropriate claims.123 Nygh J’s 
examples in Osman and Mourrali – along with those of Sullivan and the 
Deniz natural teeth example – of what is not fraud can be endorsed 
without accepting as impossible devising a pattern or principle founding 
what can constitute fraud. This does not mean individual idiosyncrasies 
are indulged. It does mean general acceptance of appurtenances of 
marriage are recognised. 
Impotence appears explicitly in the UK legislation: s 12(a) – applying 
to both male and female incapacity – although absent a requirement for 
concealment at the time of marriage. Hence, the UK could be seen as 
moving away from the fraud proposition altogether – although what 
122 [1989] FamCA 78 (17 November 1989), (1990) FLC ¶92-111 at 76,354-355 
(Emphasis added). 
123 Ibid. 
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“otherwise” means in “duress, mistake, unsoundness of mind or 
otherwise” continues to require explanation. 
In AD and VVP124and KN and EG125 the Fiji Family Court canvassed 
fraud in nullity applications where the husband was impotent at time of 
marriage, not disclosing it, and the wife would not have married him had 
she known. In both instances, nullity was granted.126 As there recognised, 
marriage is not “all about” sexual relations or childbearing. Equally 
certain, generally these are part of marriage. People can and do marry 
without childbearing intentions even when of childbearing age. People can 
and do marry without intending sexual relations.127 Yet this cannot render 
childbearing and sexual connection irrelevant to marriage or not a part of 
the generally accepted marriage relation. Hence, if a person marries 
knowing of his impotence or infertility and concealing it, this should come 
within fraud as a basis for nullity. Similarly with vaginismus or infertility 
on a putative wife’s part. 
Returning then to forced and arranged marriages, just as the meaning 
of “duress” in both can be questioned, is there a role for fraud? In Quila 
Wilson LJ saw culture as sanctifying arranged marriages and somehow 
making consent to marriage real. Should culture be recognised in 
precisely the opposite way, however - as denying capacity to give free and 
full consent? 
 
DURESS AND FRAUD IN FORCED AND ‘ARRANGED’ 
MARRIAGE 
 
Nygh J dealt with Osman and Mourrali as immigration fraud. 
However, a knowledge of Muslim and Hindu practice is essential for 
understanding the evidence and analysing the case as (possible) fraud 
under the Family Law Act (Fiji) and Marriage Act (Cth).  
What the husband said after the (civil) ceremony was:  
 
124 HCFC 0072/2007, 8 February 2008 (Scutt CJ). 
125 HCFC 0029/2008, 12 May 2008 (Scutt CJ). 
126 The current writer was Chief Judge of the Family Court Division of the High 
Court of Fiji with sole jurisdiction in relation to nullity applications. 
127 George Bernard Shaw and his wife Charlotte Payne-Townshend married with 
agreement on these terms: Michael Holroyd, Bernard Shaw: A Biography 
(Vintage/Random House, London, 1998). 
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“I don’t want to marry you, the whole purpose of the marriage 
contact was to obtain residency. I am no longer interested in 
marrying your daughter because I have legal residence.”128  
 
In Fiji, Hindu and Muslim practice has the civil marriage occurring 
first – parties often describing this as “engagement”. Then a religious or 
traditional ceremony – Muslim or Hindu – joins parties, and within their 
culture they are accepted as married. Only after the second ceremony do 
parties consummate marriage and live as husband and wife. This is, 
generally, traditional Hindu and Muslim practice in Australia and the UK 
as the cases show. 
The evidence in Osman and Mourrali confirms this pattern: the parties 
went through the (civil) marriage ceremony, then (according to the 
evidence, although Mr Osman disputed this) Mr Osman refused to go 
through the religious or traditional ceremony: “I don’t want to marry you 
…”. “I am no longer interested in marrying …” arguably referring to the 
traditional or religious ceremony, a denial of intention to go through that 
second step, essential to make marriage “real” for Ms Mourrali. Mr 
Osman did not need this, as civil marriage gained him the immigration 
status he sought. Yet the understanding of Ms Mourrali and her mother 
was that the religious or traditional ceremony would follow. This was the 
basis upon which consent to the civil ceremony was given. 
Thus analysed (that is, cognisant of the cultural background) the 
immigration issue was motive, hence properly not the basis for fraud. The 
basis for fraud was the husband’s deception as to his intention to marry 
Ms Osman according to religious or traditional practice. She married him 
– gave her consent to the civil ceremony – solely on the basis that she and 
he would then be joined through the religious or traditional ceremony.  
Until that time, they would not – and indeed did not - live as husband 
and wife for, according to religious or traditional practice, they were not 
husband and wife. This is not to ignore the key factor of legal marriage as 
the only marriage recognised in law, whether in Australia, Fiji or the UK. 
Religious marriage would not make the parties married according to 
Australian, Fijian or England and Waleslaw. But the parties would not 
have been married in accordance with England and Wales, Australian or 
Fiji law (that is, civilly) – except for the representation, relied upon by the 
128 [1989] FamCA 78 (17 November 1989), (1990) FLC ¶92-111.at 77,741.The 
references to ‘marry’ need to be understood as referring to the religious ceremony 
that ordinarily follows, or is expected to follow, the civil (legal) ceremony in 
traditional Muslim and Hindu culture. 
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wife (and her mother) that the religious or traditional ceremony would go 
ahead. 
This is a clear fraud within the context of family law – if fraud is to be 
given meaning in the Marriage Act (Cth) s 23B(1)(d)(i) and s 32(2)(d)(i); 
it could also come under “otherwise” in s 12(d). 
Nygh J’s notion that dissolution of marriage being so uncomplicated, 
its requirements easily complied with, ignores the existence of nullity by 
fraud in Australian law. Parliament intends parties to have rightful access 
to nullity. Parties are entitled to be heard on that basis. Spurious and 
fanciful cases should not be entertained as fraud. However, Osman v 
Mourrali discloses no basis upon which assertions of fancifulness or 
spuriousness can be suggested fairly. The substance of the evidence was 
that Mr Osman clearly misled Ms Mourrali. His motive for misleading her 
is, as noted, not the issue. Rather, it is what went on in Ms Osman’s head 
at the time of the civil ceremony and her position vis-à-vis marriage. She 
would not have married – would not have consented to the (civil) 
marriage, if she had not believed or expected, upon the representations of 
Mr Mourrali – that she would be married in the eyes of her faith and 
tradition or culture – through the religious or traditional ceremony. Hence, 
her consent, though given, was given by reason of fraud. Without the 
religious or traditional ceremony, Ms Osman was caught in limbo: she 
would not live with Mr Mourrali (even had he wanted her to) because of 
her faith, tradition and culture. She could not marry anyone else – as in 
law, she was married. This is precisely the sort of situation fraud is 
intended to encompass and nullity is intended to resolve.  
Turning then to duress. In Nagri and Chapal129 Mr Nagri claimed 
duress. He was 25 years at the time of the marriage. The age difference 
between Mr Nagri and Ms S in In the Marriage of S – she being a minor, 
he having reached the age of majority some years before marriage - was 
referred to explicitly by the Court. Nonetheless, nullity was granted, the 
Court saying: 
 
“… I am satisfied that in this case, because of the relationship 
between [Mr Nagri] and his uncle, [Mr Nagri] was, at the time of 
the marriage, the subject of strong feelings of family loyalty. I am 
satisfied that he accepted his uncle as standing in loco parentis. He 
was subject to religious and cultural beliefs. He believed that his 
situation was one where his uncle was entitled to demand his 
obedience.”130 
 
129 (2012) FamCA 464 (1 June 2012). 
130 Ibid [27]. 
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Mr Nagri and Ms Chapal (who did not oppose the application albeit 
her evidence was that she was a fully and freely consenting party) were 
born in India, a year apart. Mr Nagri arrived in Australia with his mother 
in 2008, financially supported by his uncle, Mr S, who financially 
supported and posted a bond for him, giving him employment and 
financial assistance. In about August 2011, Mr S told Mr Nagri of finding 
a “girl” whom he (Mr S) thought Mr Nagri should marry. When the 
parties met in September, Mr Nagri’s mother and uncle had decided on 
the marriage. Mr Nagri attempted to tell his uncle in October that he loved 
another and did not wish to marry Ms Chapal. Mr S said “it would be 
impossible at that stage that the marriage not occur” and the marriage 
“must proceed” as “arrangements” had been made and he (Mr S) had 
“given his word.”131 That month the Roka (cultural engagement 
ceremony) ensued, Mr Nagri and Ms Chapal then signing relevant 
documents at a Registry office, fixing a November date for the legal 
ceremony. On the November date, the parties performed the civil marriage 
ceremony. A month later Mr Nagri told Ms Chapal he had married under 
compulsion and a sense of duty to his family. He apologised unreservedly, 
asking her forgiveness and saying he had “acted badly”. He then refused 
to participate in the arranged Hindu ceremony, telling his mother in 
particular that he had hurt Ms Chapal and would not go through with it. 
Collier J referred to In the Marriage of S and Teves III & 
Campomayor,132 the latter simply as following the former. He noted Mr 
Nagri was economically dependent – or at least employment-dependent 
upon his uncle, however, the judgement principally relies upon family and 
cultural relationship and duty. Mr S, said Collier J, considered himself to 
be in a “pater familias” position or something “very similar”, believing he 
“had authority” and “almost absolute” authority over Mr Nagri: 
 
“It was [Mr S – the uncle’s] wish that the marriage should go 
ahead. Indeed, he was quite appalled when [Mr Nagri] suggested 
.... the marriage might not go further. He told his nephew that all 
the arrangements had been made. He particularly made it clear that 
he … would not go back on his word given to [Ms Chapal’s] 
family, that the marriage would take place …” 133  
 
This judgment accepts the role duty and obeisance to family play and 
the power they have in (some) cultural settings. Evidence from both Mr S 
131 Ibid. 
132 [1995] FLC ¶92-578. 
133 [1989] FamCA 78 (17 November 1989), (1990) FLC ¶92-111 at [11-12]. 
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and Mr Nagri’s mother confirmed pressure, with Mr S “prepared to 
acknowledge that his behaviour in this respect was such that it overbore 
the will of his nephew at the time the marriage was entered into”.134  
This is somewhat consistent with the import of Watson J’s 
determination in In the Marriage of S in recognising that duress can arise 
out of oppression in the context of familial relationships and arranged 
marriages. “Somewhat” because economic dependency is included as if 
duty and filial ties, tradition and culture are insufficient. Cases in Fiji over 
the period 2007-2009 recognised the import of tradition, culture, duty and 
filial obeisance without the need for bolstering, with a nod to economic 
dependency, this context and reality of pressure as coercion or duress. 135 
After all, at 25 and having lived in Australia for some four years, Mr 
Nagri could have sought alternative employment. However, duty and filial 
ties, tradition and culture stood in the way of his doing so. Fiji decisions 
recognise this impact as, for example, in MIR and NNJ136 where the 31-
year-old applicant had lived overseas for ten years, returning to Fiji twice 
during that time. His mother demanded his acquiescence to an arranged 
marriage. He complied, leaving ahead of the traditional or religious 
wedding. Duress lay in duty, tradition, culture and filial obedience, where 
all his alternative supports and affiliations were abroad. His role as child 
to a widowed mother undermined his capacity to resist.  
Rather than resort to economics, the impact of culture, tradition and 
religion on child-parent relations must be recognised fully. Underpinning 
parental dominance, these factors do not disappear when a child becomes 
adult. Inevitably, this raises a question as to Munby J’s position in NS v 
MI, reliant on Singer J’s reference in Re SK137 to arranged marriage.  
 
WHOSE CULTURE, WHOSE RIGHTS? 
 
In Re SK Singer J emphasised, saying it “always” needs to be 
emphasised, that forced marriage constitutes “a spectrum” ranging from 
“physical force” or “fear of injury or death in their most literal form”, 
through to the “undue imposition of emotional pressure … at the other end 
of the forced marriage range”, however: 
 
134 Ibid. 
135 Set by the present author as CJ, nullity decisions have since followed this 
precedent.  
136 FamCas No 08/2007, 6 May 2008. 
137 SK (An Adult)(Forced Marriage: Appropriate Relief)[2005] 3 All ER 421, 
[2004] EWHC 3202 (Fam).  
94 
                                                     
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
 
“… a grey area then separates unacceptable forced marriage and 
marriages arranged traditionally which are in no way to be 
condemned, but rather supported as a conventional concept in 
many societies. Social expectations can of themselves impose 
emotional pressure and the grey area to which I have referred is 
where one may slip into the other: arranged may become forced 
but forced is always different from arranged.”138 
 
Yet being “supported as a conventional concept in many societies” 
cannot make arranged marriages fully and freely consenting. 
Conventional concepts, after all, can be damaging to those obliged to 
conform to them. Women’s struggle throughout the ages, in all societies, 
to surmount patriarchy bears testament to the fact that convention is 
dictated by those in power: those lacking power are obliged to conform, or 
rebel.  
Annual UN Commission on the Status of Women conferences confirm 
that women seek to renounce conventional concepts imposed by tradition, 
religion or culture, demanding that their respective societies accept 
women as human, with human rights and entitlements. Since the League 
of Nations, international treaties have affirmed women’s struggle against 
conventions deemed acceptable by male-only and male-dominated 
parliaments and ruling bodies. 
Singer J appears unmindful or unknowing of this struggle and its 
longevity. His obeisance to cultural diktats undermining women’s 
autonomy is indicative of a thread extolling cultural difference at the 
expense of women’s rights. This ignores, too, the ICESCR which, whilst 
affirming the importance of culture within societies simultaneously 
affirms the fundamental requirement that marriage must be a freely 
consented to relation.  
Free consent is free consent to marriage –  
 
• free consent of the parties, not free consent of the parents of the 
parties, and  
 
• free consent to marriage, not “consent” to conform to culture or 
parental wishes.  
 
Nullity cases time and again reveal that arranged marriages flout the 
“free consent to marriage” standard, despite lack of kidnapping, 
transportation to foreign soil, passport confiscation, threats of abuse 
138 Ibid [7]. 
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against the child or someone else. The demand is for daughters 
(sometimes sons) to conform to culture, religion, tradition, duty and 
parental wishes. Daughters (sometimes sons) are obliged to “consent” to 
the marriage agreement we (your parents) make: “You’d better marry 
somebody we want you to …”, to paraphrase Hirani. 
The evidence in MPL v JSG is telling. The father said that had he 
known of the prospective husband’s drug problem, “consent would never 
have been given”.139 The consent referred to is consent of the father to his 
daughter’s marriage to another man’s son. Any consent the daughter was 
asserted to have exercised would be “consent” to her father’s wish that she 
marry the “partner” chosen by him. It is fanciful that free consent is given 
to marriage when parties have not met one another prior to arrival at the 
registry office, or have met only upon parental diktat. That culture says 
“meet at the registry office” (or on the wedding day, etc) cannot turn 
acquiescence into full and free consent to wed someone chosen and 
imposed by others. 
In Fiji, many parents of Indian origin are concerned that their children 
contract marriage with foreign nationals – often originally from Fiji and 
holding Australian, Canadian or Aotearoa/New Zealand citizenship – by 
reason of the country’s political situation.140 That parents generally wish 
the best for their children in these circumstances cannot oust the 
requirement of free consent to marry in real rather than fanciful terms or 
in real terms as to marriage, rather than as to “agreeing” with parental 
wishes. It cannot transform parents’ agreement to a betrothal into the 
parties’ consent to wed one another – freely. 
This is not to impose Western cultural views of marriage upon persons 
whose origins lie in other cultures. It is to say that full and free consent or 
free consent to marry means just that: full and free or free consent to 
marry a person whom a marital partner has chosen freely, rather than 
culturally imposed “consent” by filial, religious or traditional duty to the 
consent of a parent to a marital arrangement. This distinction is clearly 
recognised in Sindh Province, where “arranged” marriage of the type 
Singer J sees as “marriages arranged traditionally which are in no way to 
be condemned, but rather supported …”141 are condemned by state law. 
As the Sindh Child Marriage Restraint Act of 2013 provides:  
 
“Under the law, any groom who weds a girl under age 18, and 
parents of such a groom or those facilitating such a marriage will 
139 FHC Case No. 1182/2006 (15 February 2007) at 11. 
140 See for example KKC and PSR (Case No: 12LBS0006 (1 March 2013). 
141 SK (An Adult)(Forced Marriage: Appropriate Relief)[2005] 3 All ER 421, 
[2004] EWHC 3202 (Fam). 
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be punished with maximum three years, minimum two years, 
rigorous imprisonment, and a fine”. 
 
This is not simply about child marriage. It is about freedom to marry a 
partner of choice. So, returning to NS v MI142 Munby J there spoke of 
stereotyping, citing his judgment in Re K: 
 
“We must guard against the risk of stereotyping. We must be 
careful to ensure that our understandable concern to protect 
vulnerable children (or, indeed, vulnerable young adults) does not 
lead us to interfere inappropriately – and if inappropriately then 
unjustly – with families merely because they cleave, as this family 
does, to mores, to cultural beliefs, more or less different from what 
is familiar to those who view life from a purely Euro-centric 
perspective.”143 
 
In elevating “families”, Munby J fails to recognise that not only 
European countries adhere to the proposition that “full and free” consent 
to marriage is a matter for prospective marital partners, not for “families”. 
International treaties and conventions – agreed to by nations way over and 
beyond those from Europe or with European connections – do not refer to 
“full and free” consent by families, nor place family before the woman (or 
man) whose agreement to marriage is the issue. Nor do European states or 
those with European connections alone recognise the right of prospective 
marriage partners – not their parents – to agree fully and freely to 
marriage. In seeking to be seen as culturally sensitive, NS v MI and Re K 
apply stereotypes placing in the forefront patriarchal notions of what is 
right and proper for children, giving imprimatur to parental rights 
recognised by international treaties and conventions as wrong. 
142 [2006] EWHC 1646 (Fam). 
143 Ibid [37]. 
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